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Abstract
This contribution looks at modern discourse from two perspectives. It tries to show that the 
term ‘discourse’ has been expanded over the last few decades to include more phenomena 
and more disciplines that use it as a basis for their analyses. But it also tries to show that 
discourse in the sense of effective interaction has met its limits. The fundamental question 
is: When is discourse real discourse, i.e. more than a series of unrelated utterances and 
when is it coherent interactive communication? This paper does not intend to provide a 
new overall theoretical-methodological model, it uses examples from political discourse 
to demonstrate that popular discourse is often unfortunately less interactive than seems 
necessary, examples from academic discourse to illustrate that community conventions 
are being standardised more and more, and from humanoid-human discourse to argue that 
it is still difficult to construct agents that are recognised as discourse partners by human 
beings. Theoretical approaches to discuss these limits of discourse include coherence and 
intentionality. They can be applied to show where lack of cohesion in discourse indicates 
lack of cohesion in society.
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1 Introduction
As a contribution to the Special Issue on Specialised Discourse in Discourse 
and Interaction, it may be appropriate to look at current examples of discourse 
practices in our modern technological world. The term ‘discourse’ has become 
extremely popular in academia over the last few decades at the expense of 
‘communication’ or ‘text’. Whereas communication seems to focus on the effect 
of a text on listeners or readers and text on the product, discourse focuses on the 
interaction.
1.1 Recent expansions from the original meanings of ‘discourse’
To go back to the original meanings of ‘discourse’ (and address the 
wherefrom part of the Special Issue title), I checked the OED online (s.v.) and 
found that although the term has been part of the English language for almost 
600 years, many meanings are marked as Obsolete or Now rare. Only meanings 





6 “interaction” and 7 “body of statements” seem to be in line with the linguistic 
definition in 8 “connected series of utterances … forming a unit for analysis” 
and, to judge from the quotations, the former sense is much older than the latter:
6.  Interaction, dealings, communication.  
Apparently rare before 20th cent.; in quot. 1603 perhaps with the narrower sense 
‘familiar intercourse, familiarity’. 1603 – 2005
7.  The body of statements, analysis, opinions, etc., relating to a particular domain 
of intellectual or social activity, esp. as characterized by recurring themes, 
concepts, or values; (also) the set of shared beliefs, values, etc., implied or 
expressed by this. Frequently with of or modifying word. 1931 – 2006
8.  Linguistics. A connected series of utterances by which meaning is communicated, 
esp. one forming a unit for analysis; spoken or written communication regarded 
as consisting of such utterances.
The sense evolution recorded in the reference dictionary is reflective of some 
of the current social perspectives on discourse (cf. 1.2). However, a look at 
occurrences of discourse in contemporary corpus data (cf. 1.3) also helps throw 
light on how diffuse the term is and what meanings it has come to take.
It is interesting that discourse is presented in a similar historical development 
as conversation in the OED (s.v.). Meaning 7 of conversation contains the 
collocation familiar discourse or talk with the same discourse meaning of 
‘interaction’ as in sense 6 of discourse and, again to judge from the quotation 
dates, a similarly long history:
7a.  Interchange of thoughts and words; familiar discourse or talk. 1586 – 1871
b.  ‘A particular act of discoursing upon any subject’ (Johnson); a talk, colloquy. 
1694 – 1871
c.  to make conversation: to converse for the sake of conversing; to engage in 
small talk.
When we check the meanings of ‘discourse’ in the standard modern 
dictionaries, we notice that they do not add much to the discussion: the online 
American Merriam-Webster confirms the etymology and defines it (s.v.) as 
“verbal interchange of ideas, especially conversation”, but also “a mode of 
organizing knowledge, ideas, or experience”, which is directly linked to ‘critical 
discourse’, while the online learner dictionaries (like Longman) distinguish 
between uncountable and countable meanings.
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1.2 Changing specialised academic discourses on ‘discourse’
If we see specialised discourse as the interplay of textlinguistic and cultural 
factors in the construction of professional discourse, the interaction depends on 
the functional needs within specialised domains as well as across wider academic 
contexts. Of course, all specialised discourse must be learnt, it has no native 
speakers. Discipline-specific texts as reading material and corpus collections as 
reference are necessary (Lee & Swales 2006). And this long learning process 
must create a tension and a possible limit, especially for the non-specialist or 
specialist in another discipline or academic discourse community. Thus, such 
discourses are increasingly seen as disparate and non-specialists perceive their 
limits. However, there is a difference whether discourse partners aim at construing 
the language so that interaction is easy or difficult or even impossible for others. 
In Halliday’s terms (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen 1999), the interpersonal 
metafunction “is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through 
language, with the adoption and assignment of speech roles, with the negotiation 
of attitudes, and so on – it is language in the praxis of intersubjectivity, as 
a resource for interacting with others” (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 7).
Discourse analysis is sometimes defined as the study of language above the 
level of a sentence, of the ways sentences combine to create meaning, coherence, 
and accomplish purposes. But the local coherence we know from Halliday and 
Hasan (1976) seems not enough, if we follow Unger (2006: 27, 34):
Samet and Schank conclude that the connectivity of discourse is not just a matter 
of intersentential links, but must also involve connectivity relations between the 
main events of the text (what one might call global coherence relations)….
I conclude that it is not to other kinds of relations, or relations on different 
levels, that we must turn, but to another kind of explanation of what makes a text 
‘hang together’ and ‘make sense.’ The relevance-theoretic framework fulfils this 
condition. In this framework, the main functions of the concept of global coherence 
(ruling out ‘mock narratives’) are fulfilled by the notion of relevance itself.
In contemporary systemic functional grammar, the societal basis of discourse 
can be interpreted like this: Sequences impose a certain order on our experience in 
terms of the relations that connect one happening with another. Hence sequences 
can be used to store information about the world in the form of organized text – 
‘this is how to change tyres on your car’, ‘this is how to make cauliflower 
surprise’, etc. Such texts often fall into a clearly recognizable text type, such 
as procedures, proofs, explanations, and episodic narratives. Not all texts are 
as highly regulated as these; but it is usually possible to make some prediction 
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about the kinds of sequence, and the complexity to which sequences extend, in 
most of our culturally recognized modes of discourse (Halliday & Matthiessen 
1999: 122). In a recent introduction to discourse studies, Renkema and Schubert 
(2018: 55) “wonder” provocatively:
Discourse has many different manifestations in many different situations, from 
chat to deed of purchase, from sermon to shopping list. These manifestations are 
so different that one may wonder if the term discourse is perhaps too vague to 
span all differences.
Thus, it is safe to say that discourse is a contested term rooted in different 
disciplines and used in a variety of ways. In a narrow sense, discourse can be 
understood as language in use – everyday ways of talking – what James Gee 
in his book Social linguistics and literacies: Ideology in Discourses (1990) 
refers to as ‘little d’ discourse. In a broader sense, it can be used to refer to 
a system of language use and other meaning-making practices (e.g. behaviour, 
dress, and customary practices/habits) that form ways of talking about social 
reality what Gee refers to as ‘big D’ Discourse (also see “Discourse” in Glossary 
of Multimodal Terms, n.d.). In a contemporary sociological perspective of 
discourse, this reads like this:
It is also worth noting that discourses, as defined above, are always ideological 
and ‘positioned’ ways of presenting social practices in the world and life in 
general, which means that they are not casual, but always come from somewhere. 
For example, political parties and political organisations often produce and 
reproduce particular discourses about events and phenomena which are deemed 
important by society in general: a preferred discourse of education where there 
is public debate about declining standards, or a preferred discourse produced by 
representatives of a government keen to convince the public that the economy is 
going well. (Block 2019: 10)
This quote brings in the notion of ‘discourse community’, or the users’ sets of 
values and ideologies, a notion reflected in the OED definition n. 7 above and a 
relevant one to explore where specialised discourse is going and how it must be 
construed to be perceived as effective or even harmonious.
1.3 Current usage in the News-On-the-Web (NOW) Corpus
If we want to follow up the actual current usage of the term discourse, 
modern web-as-corpus methodologies provide interesting opportunities. When 
we look at the frequency of the term discourse in the BYU Corpora (Davies 
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2016), we notice a steady increase over the last one hundred years (in the Corpus 
of Historical American English (COHA)) and a stably high figure over the last 
ten years (esp. in the News-On-the-Web (NOW) Corpus). In the collocations 
(Figure 1), we recognise the dominance of ‘political’ discourse, including public 
or national. The collocates intellectual and academic are less important in this 
database. It is also interesting that media discourse is not (yet?) prominent in the 
NOW Corpus. And still, in particular social media have made a dramatic impact 
on the political discourse over the last few years with the growing concern about 
hate speech and fake news (Schmied 2012, 2017), especially in the discourse on 
Twitter and Facebook.
Figure 1: The collocates of ‘discourse’ in the News-On-the-Web (NOW) Corpus
When we look at the usage (Figure 2) in the BYU Word and Phrase Info 
(based on the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA)), we see 
that discourse is clearly an academic word and related to two groups of genres, 
dialogue and dissertation. These recall the OED dictionary entry (meanings 
6 ‘interaction’ and 7 ‘body of statements, analyses and opinions… related to 
a particular domain, intellectual or social activity’) and are also found in the 
“Wordnet” definitions 1 and 2 in Figure 2: discourse is the most frequent in the 
dialogue class and an important member of the dissertation class (on the left). 
The collocates list and the sample sentences confirm this usage (on the right).
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Figure 2:  “Discourse” in the BYU ‘info’, based on the Corpus of Contemporary American 
(COCA)
The dynamic development of ‘discourse’ over the last thirty years can be seen 
in the increase of computer-mediated communication. Basically all discourse 
is digital today: personal letters were replaced by email, printed by online 
newspapers, encyclopaedias by Wikipedia (even the Britannica is only available 
online today), company circulars have turned into Twitter messages (Darics 
2015), etc. It is interesting that this digitalisation of discourse has occasionally 
made the interactive meaning component of ‘discourse’ more clearly visible 
(e.g. comments can be linked more directly to the electronic article today than in 
traditional letters-to-the-editor and up-dates can be made more easily and more 
easily traceable in Wikipedia than in traditional encyclopaedias), but it has also 
increased the dangers of losing track of the interaction (e.g. within the comments 
under a newspaper article or within Twitter tweets). This calls for a new, strict 
definition of the concept of ‘discourse’.
1.4		A	new	linguistic	definition	of	discourse	based	on	increasing	awareness	of	
limits of good discourse and explicit discourse cohesion
For the purposes of this paper on the limits of discourse, I propose a narrow 
linguistic definition of (good) discourse to set it apart from the many cases where 
discourse was more related to discord than to communication and dialogue in a 
positive sense. I see ‘discourse’ as primarily verbal (but multimodal) interaction 
between humans (increasingly using digital tools and media) (ideally) based 
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on human cooperation, understanding and responsibility. I will then show the 
limits of discourse, which could also be called ‘discord discourse’, because the 
coherence is not made explicit (enough) or not even intended, because writers 
do not want to engage with their discourse partners. I try to exemplify this by 
looking at three different discourse types and ask critical questions:
1) Can we see fake news and many other non-communicative social media 
interaction as effective discourse?
2) Can we analyse academic discourse as understanding conventions that 
make readers feel ‘at ease”? ‘
3) Can we regard computer generated, humanoid-human discourse as credible 
discourse in academic settings?
4) Can we find functional linguistic concepts that can be used to signal mutual 
effort to interactive, coherent discourse?
Whereas the first question refers to wrong or no intentions of construing 
effective discourse, the second refers to insufficient conventional construal of 
effective discourse, the third to the insufficient explicit construal of effective 
discourse and the final question focuses on the linguistic contribution in this new 
definition of ‘discourse’.
2	 Social	media	and	flouting	of	discourses
Today’s ubiquitous social media discourse can be seen as a special case of 
computer-mediated communication (CMC, cf. Herring 1996). What was seen 
as a special advantage of CMC, that it can be free from disturbing influences 
and physical context, can also be seen as its major disadvantage now, when all 
bonds of social behaviour may be lost and CMC can shape anti-social behaviour 
and online conflict. CMC today is an interesting multimodal discourse, where 
conventionalized cues, like images, symbols, memes, even animations provide 
a seemingly endless reservoir for anti-social behaviour, which also makes it so 
difficult to define the limits of free speech and to counter hate speech in the social 
media automatically.
2.1 ‘Discourse’ in social media like Twitter
Discourse approaches have been used to analyse social media posts or 
tweets. In particular “negatively marked online behaviour”, like flaming and 
trolling (e.g. Hardaker 2017), has been discussed for about 20 years (cf. Jucker 
& Taavitsainen 2000), but it has only been perceived as an online epidemic 
since the international use of Facebook and Twitter. Now ‘cyberstalking’ and 
‘disruptive discourse’ have to be analysed in terms of impoliteness or even 
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hostility (cf. Culpeper 1996). The following three examples illustrate the 
phenomenon of ‘limits of discourse’, because the messages are obviously not 
intended for interaction, but as a ‘discord discourse’:
(1)  Trump’s October surprise will be the announcement of “his infection.” Fake, but 
quite dramatic. This twist will blow Biden off the screens, the “Trump COVID 
watch” dominating every minute of every day. Then, 14 days later, Trump will 
emerge, 100% cured by hydroxychloroquine. (@JohnCammo 18.09.2020, 
accessed 02.10.2020)
(2)   “twitter: noooo you cannot make fun of supreme court lady dying that is so 
mean!!!!!! also twitter: haha orange man get corona coof hope he dies lol” 
(@JohnSwanYT 02.10.2020, accessed 02.10.2020)
(3)  “Cancel culture is stupid but Bill Maher reallyyyyy needs to get canceled” 
(@seltbra28.09.2020, accessed 02.10.2020)
The first satiric post has been retweeted as a prophetic statement about 
President Trump’s COVID infection. It is part of a conspiracy theory that the 
contamination is fake and planned to support his campaign. The tweet also ironises 
another controversy around the treatment hydroxychloroquine, but in this heated 
discourse atmosphere, irony is never a good cooperative discourse strategy. It 
rather terminates and accentuates a point than continuing the argumentation.
The second tweet mirrors and ironises discrepant internet discourses on death 
and disease. The casual style, oral tone and the missing definite articles are in 
stark contrast to the serious topic. It purposefully does not name the persons 
but shows the hypocrisy in the different treatments of “supreme court lady” and 
“orange man”. The recently trending term Schadenfreude [gloat] around Trump’s 
illness is evidence of the active discussion on hate discourse online.
The third tweet is just another example of the many heated debates on 
cancel culture. Cancel culture, the practice of holding celebrities accountable for 
their wrong deeds or even ascribed attitudes and dismissing them from society 
through hate and disapproval, has been at the centre of social debate lately. Some 
perceive it as mobbing and are willing to give the cancelled subjects a chance 
for repentance, while others find it fair to reject individuals from society due to 
their wrong actions.
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Figure 3:  Main tweet by Philip Crowther (journalist for the Associated Press) reporting on 
Trump’s short excursion from the hospital greeting his supporters
Even more complex is Figure 3, not only because it is a multimodal 
documentation. The main tweet by journalist Philip Crowther objectively reports 
about Trump leaving the hospital for a few minutes, where he was treated for his 
COVID infection, greeting his supporters on the street. The replies following 
this tweet in Figure 4 look like a discourse, when in fact it is rather a sequence 
of monologues related to the same topic, but without direct reference and 
directed coherence to the preceding main tweet. They can be thus regarded 
as a discourse/text colony, i.e. a discourse whose adjacent components do not 
form continuous prose and may be used separately without referring to others 
(cf. Dontcheva-Navratilova 2009: 51).
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Figure 4: Replies to the main tweet
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The crucial point is that although the ‘discourse’ is all on the US president, 
the focus is always so different that the local coherence is completely lost: first, 
user Kenyotta believes that Trump’s COVID infection is made up because for 
the user it is simply unthinkable that an infected person would knowingly sit 
in a car and risk other’s lives. The thread continues with obviously insulting 
thoughts about other patients in the hospital who are disturbed in their healing 
processes by “idiots honking their horns” supporting the US President. Kittyjo, 
apparently a Trump supporter, turns the insult into a rather positive reply by 
bringing up her religious beliefs and prayers for the US President. The following 
replies refer directly to the main tweet by Philip Crowther and shift the focus of 
their discourses again. Although the main discourse is still about Trump, users 
measamnotabot and Jack shift to his alleged tax fraud because he seems to be 
cured and people should go back to normalcy by talking about the real issues that 
were discussed before Trump’s infection. The preceding replies by ManaMana 
and #MAGAKAG2020 refer back to the original main tweet, whereas the first 
reply accuses Trump of knowingly infecting his Secret Service agents and the 
latter one drawing the conclusion that ManaMana is a left-wing supporter who 
constantly change their narrative about their opinion on law enforcement and 
whether masks prevent the uncontrollable spread of the virus. Although user 
ManaMana may not have intended any of these presuppositions, the original 
discourse is once again disrupted and shows how deeply divided this nation 
really is. The last reply by OLLIESMOM is similar to the first one by Kenyotta 
displaying a clear disbelief in Trump’s Covid infection.
From this short excerpt, one can already see that this kind of discourse is 
usually not based on a mutual understanding and cooperation in a communicative 
act. One reason for that surely is this highly controversial figure of the US 
President, who triggers very opposing emotions and sentiments. A second reason 
why Twitter may be a good example for discord/disruptive discourse is that 
everyone who has a Twitter account can take part in this kind of discourse no 
matter which background the person has or which beliefs they hold. A third and 
final reason for its disruptive character may be the extremely ramified structure 
and the vast number of these tweets and their replies, i.e. no one is able to read 
each and every reply and make sense of it. Therefore, a lot of parallel discourses 
are started that on the surface belong to the original thread, but if the reader dives 
deeper into them they talk about very diverse and unrelated subject matters – 
discourse at its limits.
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2.2 Social media “ruin political discourse”?
It is therefore not surprising that political commentators have claimed 
(provocatively?) “Social Media Are Ruining Political Discourse” (Bolter 2019). 
In the days of fake news and identity discourses, this is a huge political problem 
between interest groups. The net result of these communication problems is 
that each group ethnically stereotypes the other and in extreme cases no serious 
democratic discourse seems possible. Recent books on political discourses have 
even come up with the notion of ‘corrupt discourses’:
I discuss post-truth and bullshit, but I also incorporate into my terminological 
repertoire ‘agnotology’ – in short hand, the propagation of ignorance – and 
‘corrupt discourses’ – which refers to attempts to cover up corrupt activity in 
and of themselves, along with the perversion of communication that occurs when 
politicians enter a spiral of mendacity in attempts to conceal wrongdoing. (Block 
2019: 5)
From a linguistic perspective, the idea of text corruption has always been 
related to linguistic computing or to text-linguistics. Here the linguistic coherence 
mirrors the social coherence, or rather lack thereof:
Coherence is a defining characteristic of text. The principles of coherence are 
social in their origins and, being social, they point to meanings about ‘social order’. 
The coherence of a text derives from the coherence of the social environment 
in which it is produced, or which it projects; it is realized by semiotic means. 
Nevertheless, the decision to select particular aspects of coherence, to shape 
coherence, to attribute coherence to a textual/semiotic entity or to deny it the 
status of coherence is always the act of a socially located maker and re-maker of 
a text. Power is involved in the making, recognition and attribution of coherence 
in a text. (Kress 2012: 36)
The recent development of digital communication has contributed enormously 
to the problem: “Notions of (in-)coherence are hugely more problematic and 
difficult: coherence and incoherence have become more visible with the ubiquity 
of screens and more difficult to establish with a move to horizontally organized 
power” (Kress 2012: 47). Figure 5 is an interesting example, because it shows 
that ‘discord discourse’ phenomena are not at all restricted to ‘the West’ and are 
frequent in a social media democracy like Nigeria (cf. also Opeibi 2018, Schmied 
2018). In this example of limited discourse, the ‘reply’ to the ‘revolution’ is 
a birthday wish, contrasting national corruption and national pride, only the 
last phrase links the contrasting views by referring back to “those of you who 
never see”.
Limits of Discourse:  
Examples from Political, Academic, and Human-Agent Interaction
101
Figure 5: Political activism on Nigerian Twitter
3	 Perception	of	specific	discourse	usage	in	academic	writing
3.1	Influence	of	social	media	on	academic	writing
As social media usage is so common today among “millennials”, the question 
is how this has affected writing styles in academic contexts. Rachel Cayley 
(2014) argues:
At a broad level, it seems clear to me that social media is beneficial for us as 
writers. When we write on social media, our natural ability to express ourselves 
may remind us that writing per se is not always the problem. Formal academic 
writing for an audience that seems both inscrutable and implacable can easily 
undermine our confidence. An opportunity to write more freely – with less 




She identifies “three ways that social media writing can inform our 
development as writers”: concision, tone, and nuance. While I am not convinced 
that “By writing things that are more direct or casual or polemical, we are 
better able to understand how such qualities may or may not operate within our 
more formal academic prose” (ibid.), I find interesting (in view of our previous 
discussion of interaction in social media) what she adds about disagreeing 
‘respectfully’ in Twitter:
I find that Twitter is great for sharing things that I like, but not so good 
for those things about which I have significant reservations. Without room for 
caveats, we are left without an easy way to disagree respectfully. (ibid.)
It seems paradoxical that such negative, even chaotic discourse as above 
should induce well-planned, conventional discourse and wishful thinking that 
“writing for immediate consumption” requires “a more disciplined approach to 
writing”. It remains arguable whether “greater awareness of the conventionality 
of writing will increase the chance that we will be able to find ways to work 
productively within those conventions” (ibid.).
3.2 Conventionalisation of academic genres
In recent years, academic writing classes have been introduced 
at European universities and metalanguage is taught explicitly on 
the local level (e.g. logical connectors) or on the global level (e.g. 
Introduction+Methodology+Results+Discussion=IMRaD structures for 
empirical studies). Of course, writers can always choose whether to follow 
disciplinary conventions or emphasise their individual identities. For academic 
success, it is important to know the conventions of academic genres, even for 
writers who consciously avoid using them, because they do not want to sound 
stereotypical or even robot-like (cf. 4.1 below). Strict conventions have advantages 
for the immediate discourse community, but they limit the accessibility for a 
wider audience or readership.
Example 4 illustrating German student writing taken from a discussion 
section in a BA thesis in Linguistics (ChemCorpus, Schmied 2015) shows that 
although local cohesion markers are inserted to help the reader to understand the 
coherence of the text, the argumentation is not as logically coherent as the rich 
academic vocabulary may suggest.
(4)  The results have clearly shown that both learner groups encounter difficulties 
when producing relative clauses in their second language writing. As a matter 
of fact, 12 categories which were applicable to the analysis of both data sets 
were found. That leads to the assumption that, on average, both learner groups 
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are confronted with the same problems. The assumption was proved via a chi-
square test. This statistical investigation (cf. appendix for steps of calculation) 
of the overall results (cf. Figure x) showed that the differences across the error 
frequencies are not significant. Thus, the error frequencies are approximately 
equivalent. Generally, that could be due to the fact that both English and Italian 
belong to the Proto-Indo-European language family, however as pointed out in 
chapter 2.3.2, they belong to different subgroups, viz., Italic and Germanic. To my 
mind, that would give ground for an argumentation that since Italian and German 
belong to different subgroups, the 12 mutual categories were only found due to 
pure chance, with addition of three further categories that were exclusively found 
during the analysis of the Italian data. (BA09Ft_SK)
The four explicit logical connectors underlined are questionable: The first 
causal connector seems to suggest that if all cases could be assigned to only 
12 categories, the difficulties/problems must be similar, but this is difficult to assess 
if we are not told explicitly (again) how many cases there were in this analysis 
and how many possible categories there are in the related literature. The second 
causal connector, thus, introduces a clause whose relationship with the previous 
clause is rather synonymous (not significant = approximately equivalent), not 
causal. The contrastive connector however is interesting, as the contrast is not 
with the previous statement, the same family, but within the following, different 
subcategories of the language family. And then the hard argumentation seems to 
be thrown away by regressing to “pure chance”? And the final in addition looks 
like a small aside, but in fact points out a gross reader misunderstanding (only 
12 categories above): there are only 12 mutual categories, but another three for 
the Italian exclusively.
3.3  Eye-tracking as an indicator of reader ‘thoughts’ and problems of 
interaction
This argumentation of how far the writer’s text is accepted as logical by the 
reader also explains the recent focus in academic discourse on reader perception. 
Such pragmatic phenomena can be approached in terms of global coherence 
(cf. Unger 2006 and in 1 above), but also through a number of psycholinguistic 
experiments. The results of recordings of eye movement and non-movement 
during reading exercises (Pickering & Traxler 1998, Roberts & Siyanova-
Chanturia 2013) give us unique insights into readers’ ‘thoughts’ today. Thus 
discourse problems on the readers’ side become visible if they stop and ‘think’ 
or if they go back to find cohesive phenomena in the text to help them find the 





Today we have learnt to live with general models of talking robots from 
Amazon’s Alexa to Google’s Siri, but most of them are still confined to 
rudimentary order – execution interactions. The recent construction of Sophia 
(Makerspace 2017) is more challenging to our concepts of discourse, since the 
robots seem to do more than simply reproduce input2.
In our own professional capacity of writers, we are challenged by systems 
like Smart Compose. Seabrook (2019) tested the current AI options for creative 
writers and had a “creepy” experience:
(5)  Finally, I crossed my Rubicon. The sentence itself was a pedestrian affair. Typing 
an e-mail to my son, I began “I am p–” and was about to write “pleased” when 
predictive text suggested “proud of you.” I am proud of you. Wow, I don’t say that 
enough. And clearly Smart Compose thinks that’s what most fathers in my state 
say to their sons in e-mails. I hit Tab. No biggie.
  And yet, sitting there at the keyboard, I could feel the uncanny valley prickling 
my neck. It wasn’t that Smart Compose had guessed correctly where my thoughts 
were headed – in fact, it hadn’t. The creepy thing was that the machine was more 
thoughtful than I was.
  Read Predicted Text Generated by GPT-2 (including any quotes)
  By that I mean, it seemed to want to distinguish my feelings from my thoughts. To 
put it another way, Smart Compose seemed to want to know me. (Text generation 
by Smart Compose (Seabrook 2019: 5))
The online version of the text in Example 5 is necessary, because the last 
paragraph after underlined “Read Predicted Text” is initially hidden and 
automatically generated.
If neural networks can predict our style for sentences ahead, the conventions 
of academic writing may become even more restricted – and the breaking of these 
conventions a sign of creativity and human professionalism. This is an interesting 
case where conventional genre-specific discourse may be provided by robots on 
the basis of a combination of disciplinary corpora and personal writings. Then 
professional discourse is really inspiring where it is not predictable too much. 
Thus, these developments in artificial intelligence may produce a contrast to the 
argumentation that conventions make the reader feel “at ease” – we are not, if we 
get the feeling that this is robot-like?
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4.2  Constructing human-humanoid-human interaction with neural 
networks
The use of neural networks for speech production has made enormous progress 
over the last few years (Rutherford et al. 2016). The interface of Google’s Siri 
is publicly available and allows us to test how much input is necessary for a 
humanoid agent to produce an output that puts a human listener at ease with “the 
machine”, either in accepting advice or in learning. Here language variation plays 
an important role. Of course, for native speakers features of their own language 
variety may create familiarity and lend credibility to the discourse partner. For 
non-native varieties this is much more difficult, not only because of the vast 
number of (non-standardized) varieties, but also because attitudes to different 
variants are not easy to predict. This does not only depend on linguistic variables 
(such as vowels, consonants, intonation contours, etc.), but also on personal and 
situational variables (like speed, pitch, emotion, etc.).
The following diagram (Figure 6) explains the four (reiterated) stages of a 
project that aims at generating non-native English output that is accepted as a 
basis for effective interaction by different groups of human discourse partners. 
In research stage 1, a database has to be compiled as input for an agent whose 
output aims at being a credible discourse partner. In stage 2, textual and (socio-) 
linguistic features can be modified to generate an output that is assessed positively 
in effective discourse. In stage 3, refined data-base and features are combined to 
create different personas (suggesting more partnership in some discourse cultures, 
more authority in others). Finally, in the last stage, the different personas are put 




Figure 6: Iteration of four research stages of the humanoid agent as teacher (Schmied et al. fc.)
In the context of our argumentation on the limits of discourse, the project 
is interesting because we experiment through construing different discourses 
by changing the linguistic (and semiotic) input variables and measuring the 
subjective and objective efficiency of the interaction (details in Schmied et al. 
fc.). Linguistic input variables cover the whole range of linguistic features: 
pronunciation may vary from international standards to non-native familiar or 
unfamiliar features (e.g. consonants, vowels, intonation, speed, voice quality), 
lexicon may vary from general academic to discourse-community specific, 
grammar from simple to complex, etc. In any case we need the explicit indication 
of the willingness to interact well in the human input, the humanoid output and 
the human perception of this output.
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4.3	Credibility	for	an	effective	humanoid	teacher?
If we aim for ideal discourse in the research procedure established in Figure 
6 above, the input into the neural networks must be varied according to the 
overarching objectives: establishing positive discourse directed at cooperative 
interaction, credibility on the basis of acceptability of language and (perceived) 
personality and then measurable effective communication on the basis of content. 
Here a different limit of discourse can be noticed: Do we find an agent better when 
it is more conventional and stereotypical? Do some discord phenomena disturb 
the discourse and must they be eliminated through more and better input or do 
they make the humanoid agent more human and more credible and effective?
From a linguistic point of view, the old psychological concept of credibility 
(Hovland et al. 1953, Finn et al. 2009) is a good starting point to develop a more 
complex concept. It has text-linguistic (explicit) and sociolinguistic (attitudinal) 
components. Since we aim at constructing credibility, we reverse the traditional 
computational perspective that tried to evaluate the credibility of texts, usually 
WWW pages, by linguistic indicators among others. Whereas politicians (or the 
social media advisers) may define credibility as “offering reasonable grounds 
for being believed”, the OED (s.v.) defines it as “the quality or state of being 
credible; capacity to be believed or believed in” and links it immediately to 
“credibility gap”:
Originally U.S. a discrepancy between what is said or promised and what happens 
or is true; a disinclination to accept (esp. official) statements at face value.
Of course, this does not help much. We have to look up “credible” (s.v.):
1.  a. Able to be believed in, justifying confidence; convincingly honest, principled, 
or authentic and often, as a corollary, accurate (passing into sense A. 1b); 
trustworthy, reliable.
b. Able to be believed; convincingly true or accurate.
c.  Able to be believed in as effective or operational. Originally of a nuclear 
weapon: considered likely to be used.
From perspective of constructing a credible agent (in 4.2), it is the last sense 
that is most suitable. In the following OED senses, it is also interesting to see the 




2.  Ready, willing, or inclined to believe; credulous. Now commonly regarded as 
erroneous by usage writers.
3.  Having or deserving credit or repute; creditable, reputable. Now only of an 
action, effort, or performance. Now commonly regarded as erroneous by usage 
writers.
Thus, the humanoid agent must receive human1 input that the neural network 
can use to produce an output that achieves credible1a and credible1b responses 
and thus a credible1c discourse. Human2 must be credible2=credulous and 
the humanoid must be credible3=creditable to achieve a fruitful (educational) 
discourse.
5  Towards functional approaches to the limits of discourse: Explicit 
Intentionality cohesion
In this contribution, I have discussed the limits of a traditional concept of 
discourse that can be perceived when the defining criterion of interaction is 
not met. Discord in discourse may be interesting and even ‘human’ in some 
situations, but it simply means more work for the reader in others. Of course, 
we cannot develop a comprehensive meta-theory on the basis of these examples, 
it may be enough to start integrating the new digital affordances into a cyber-
pragmatic approach (cf. Romero-Trillo 2016). I am convinced that all these 
elements can be integrated into the current systemic functional framework 
(Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). The case study on the Hong Kong “umbrella 
movement” by Li et al. (2019) is an interesting attempt in this direction. In the 
final section, I would only like to recapitulate a few linguistic concepts that may 
be good starting points for discussing such crucial issues of our times.
5.1 Communication and intentions
In the widest context, modern linguists have been aware of problems in 
communication for over a hundred years. Since de Saussure, communication 
models have made it clear that effective communication is not just encoding and 
decoding of given information. For Posner (1993: 217), for instance, it involves
• beliefs,
• intentions to make others believe,
• intentions to modify one’s own beliefs and
•  intentions to make the partners act in specific ways straight away or 
later on.
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This wider world view is well-known as a gigantic issue for computer 
communication, but it is not enough. In our discourse perspective, it is important 
how much and how deep intentions are encoded in language, in the text. As it 
is no use to speculate about intentions, we need to focus on explicit signals of 
intention in discourse, as we have focused on cohesion signals to help readers to 
see coherence in text for almost 50 years. All these functional linguistic concepts 
are important elements in our discussion of coherent, interactive and constructive 
discourse.
5.2 Intentionality in the philosophy of language
In psychology, education and related disciplines, the concept of intentionality 
has been developed, but the meanings are often quite different and intentionality 
has been taken as the cognitive basis of intentions (Jankovic & Ludwig 2018). In 
the philosophy of language, Searle (1983) made intentionality a central concept 
that was only slightly extended by Stalnaker (1999). Searle (1983: 1) defines: 
“Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they 
are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world” and makes 
the distinction between intention and Intentionality clear at the very beginning:
Intending and intentions are just one form of Intentionality among others, they 
have no special status. The obvious pun on “Intentionality” and “intention” 
suggests that intentions in the ordinary sense have some special role in the theory 
of Intentionality; but on my account intending to do something is just one form of 
Intentionality along with belief, hope, fear, desire, and lots of others; ... In order 
to keep this distinction completely clear I will capitalize the technical sense of 
“Intentional” and “Intentionality”. Intentionality is directedness; intending to do 
something is just one kind of Intentionality among others. (Searle 1983: 3)
For linguists, it may be tempting to overestimate the role of language, but 
Searle warns:
By explaining Intentionality in terms of language I do not mean to imply that 
Intentionality is essentially and necessarily linguistic… to attribute Intentionality 
to animals even though they do not have a language … the relation of logical 
dependence is precisely the reverse. Language is derived from Intentionality and 
not conversely. (Searle 1983: 5)
Searle also contributes explicitly to our discussion of ‘discord discourse’ in 
his discussion of speech acts:
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The performance of the speech act is eo ipso an expression of the corresponding 
Intentional state; and, consequently, it is logically odd, though not self-
contradictory, to perform the speech act and deny the presence of the corresponding 
Intentional state. (Searle 1983: 9)
In his list of Intentional states (Searle 1983: 4), he includes among many 
others3 “acceptance” and “respect”, which are particularly important for our 
concept of cohesive discourse, which emphasises the linguistic indicators of and 
cues directed at interaction. For our discussion of discourse, language and speech 
acts are the basis:
But the members of the directive class of speech acts – orders, commands, 
requests, etc. – and the members of the commissive class – promises, vows, 
pledges, etc. – are not supposed to match an independently existing reality but 
rather are supposed to bring about changes in the world so that the world matches 
the propositional content of the speech act; and to the extent that they do or fail 
to do that, we do not say they are true or false but rather such things as that they 
are obeyed or disobeyed, fulfilled, complied with, kept or broken. I mark this 
distinction by saying that the assertive class has the word-to-world direction of fit 
and the commissive and directive classes have the world-to-word direction of fit. 
If the statement is not true, it is the statement which is at fault, not the world; if 
the order is disobeyed or the promise broken it is not the order or promise which 
is at fault, but the world in the person of the disobeyer of the order or the breaker 
of the promise. Intuitively we might say the idea of direction of fit is that of 
responsibility for fitting. (Searle 1983: 7)
The concept of intentionality needs at least two important additions for 
our argumentation. The central concept of direction-of-fit here corresponds 
with the pre-requisite of textual coherence in real successful discourse in the 
sense of Grice’s coherence principle (originally ‘the principle of conversational 
helpfulness’, or of ‘conversational benevolence’):
So I would like to be able to show that observation of the Cooperative Principle 
and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that anyone who 
cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as 
giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) 
must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation 
in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are 
conducted in general accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims. 
(Grice 1991 [1989]: 30).
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In their book Relevance, Sperber and Wilson (1995) develop an explicit 
theory of ostensive-inferential communication. This theory is designed to 
explain the inferential aspects of ostensive communication: how a hearer bridges 
the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s intended meaning. Sperber and 
Wilson see intention as a defining criterion of communication, they distinguish 
explicitly between informative and communicative intentions and they define 
the latter as “to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator 
that the communicator has this informative intention” (ibid.: 61). Here again 
discord discourse would act against the conventional view that discourse implies 
cooperative, effective interaction.
5.3  Explicit Intentionality cohesion to signal the intention to cooperate in 
discourse
When Halliday and Hasan (1976) developed their concept of cohesion in text, 
as “linguistic means whereby texture is achieved” (ibid: 293), they did discuss 
“tight and loose texture” (ibid: 295-297), but they did not discuss “tight and loose 
discourse”. None of their major cohesion categories (reference, substitution, 
ellipsis, conjunction, and even lexical cohesion) focus on discourse in our sense 
of interpersonal interaction between partners. Their small section “7.4.2. The 
texture of discourse” (ibid.: 326-7) states explicitly “Other forms of discourse are 
more obviously structured than conversation” (ibid.: 327) and then focuses on 
narratives, and even “literary forms, including ‘strict’ verse forms” (ibid), which 
does not help much in our argumentation here. The only phrase where Halliday 
and Hasan touch our problem of continuity in interactive discourse is this:
It is the continuity provided by the cohesion that enables the reader or listener 
to supply all the missing pieces, all the components of the picture which are not 
present in the text but are necessary to its interpretation. (ibid.: 299)
In the following brief discussion of comprehension problems, they always 
assume that the speaker/writer is willing to put enough effort into the text to make 
the decoding possible and easy. They focus on “how much can often be recovered 
simply from the presuppositions carried by the cohesive elements” (ibid.: 303). 
The concept of the ‘texture of discourse’ is not mentioned in Halliday and 
Matthiessen (2014), although it can, of course, be seen in the structural resources 
theme/rheme and given/new. But the problem of the limited effort in encoding or 
decoding a text to ensure continuity of the discourse is not addressed explicitly.
Thus, if we intend to be cooperative in political, academic and human-humanoid 
discourse without risking its limits, explicit cohesion markers can be used to 
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signal intentionality in Searle’s sense (above). All cohesive devices are welcome 
and may be used as explicitly as possible. This includes the reciprocal use of 
personal pronouns like I/we and you and the explicit repetition of lexical items – 
apart from the formal signals like indentations and threads on Twitter, which are 
partly automatically provided since the problem is so obvious.
If we take the tweets in Figure 4 as examples, we could imagine polite, i.e. 
interacting, discourse using different types of cohesive signals (italicised) in the 
replies that take up elements in the main tweet explicitly:
The first reply by Kenyotta could state explicitly: Your pictures show that Trump 
sits too close to the driver and his secret service men …
The second by Soph could refer back to the main tweet by repeating supporters, 
not replacing the reference by the insult idiots; it is good that she picks up the 
lexeme hospital directly and elaborates in this semantic field consistently by 
using sick, pain, and compassionate, so that this tweet has a better inner cohesion 
than most.
Kittyjo is apparently so full of religious language that she even capitalizes not 
only God, but also Great President and refers back lexically to supporters in the 
main tweet. Then, however, she addresses the team, probably not in the car, but 
in general? – a lost thread? Finally the negative and hate may refer to a general 
public or the tweets above. Despite the good inner cohesion, the relationship to 
the original tweet with the excursion photos is not clear at all, so that this tweet 
shows little cohesion to the utterances before and little cooperative intentionality; 
it intends to preach at other writers and not discuss with them.
measamnotabot maintains the link his to the noun President in the previous and 
main tweet, but the rest has no reference whatsoever to the main tweet, maybe the 
big car triggered the association rich and taxes?
Jack’s reply has good cohesive signals directly to the tweet before by picking up 
taxes and a brief quote, but the formal link to the original tweet is not justified 
through cohesive signals.
ManaMana refers not only to the main tweet and another one, as formally indicated, 
but also to Kenyotta and Soph at the beginning of these replies, because of the 
lexical cohesion through health from the semantic field hospital/virus above.
#MAGAKAG2020 selects the virus narratives focusing on the pros and cons of 
masks including the law enforcement (all prominent in US presidential discourses) 
and turns all this against the left … Here the desire is obvious to “warm up” the 
annoying mask controversy that is hardly part of this discourse of the presidential 
drive-by. Many cohesive and argumentation links would be necessary – hardly 
imaginable in this heated twitter discourse.
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OLLIESMOM is similar to the first tweet because of the semantic link stunt 
– staged event. More explicit reference to “This whole drive-by outside the 
hospital”, as in the main tweet may seem more work, but also polite, of course, 
since it is difficult to follow such links after a while, so making them very explicit 
should always help …
In conclusion, we have to admit that when we look explicitly at the standard 
cohesive categories suggested by Halliday and Hasan (1976), we discover 
many pronominal and lexical signals that indicate continuity and coherence – 
consciously or unconsciously. But finding the direct reference to the main and 
previous tweets is often hard work for the cooperative reader, so that we can argue 
whether the signals are clear enough or should be reconsidered consciously. Of 
course, readers will always find coherence if they are willing to work on it, but it 
is always polite by writers if they make the work easier for their readers or avoid 
misunderstandings. Both sides can indicate their intention to good discourse 
through mutual Intentionality in cohesive forms in adjacent phrases. The clear 
indication of Intentionality by using explicit and easy cohesive signals is a 
starting point for good interactive discourse that can be appreciated by partners 
in the ideal(ised) discourse we discuss here. Cohesive signals of intentionality 
from one utterance to the other are a minimum – maybe even more indicators can 
be found and should be used to overcome the limits of discourse today.
Evidently, the general suggestion to increase cohesive signals has been 
applied in many academic writing classes already. It has also been criticised as 
typical of non-native writing, because empirical studies have shown that many 
(often stereotypical and not logical) forms appear teaching-induced. In this 
context, we have to remind ourselves that there are no native speakers and no 
native norms for academic English and thus it remains a matter of convention 
and writer identity whether explicit cohesion markers are perceived as polite or 
annoying.
In general, from a linguistic perspective, all this looks like hard encoding work 
and even the modest suggestions for more explicit cohesion above may be seen as 
overdone, as including too much redundancy, but in digital communication and 
especially on social media it seems better to be more than explicit and include 
redundancy, possibly more than seems necessary at the moment of writing. Thus 
we become aware of the well-known observation that “A language is a series 





If we try to reinterpret our limits of discourse in the three critical types of 
discourse outlined above (in 1.4), we take Searle’s conditions of satisfaction as a 
starting point: “Every Intentional state with a direction of fit is a representation 
of its conditions of satisfaction” (Searle 1983: 13).
In political social media discourse, as I have tried to illustrate with examples 
from Twitter, the limits of discourse have become obvious to everyone. Opposed 
political parties have become enemies and talk (even shout) more at each other 
than with each other. Thus, cooperation is made impossible and even denied. 
This makes the essential interactive cooperative behaviour a defining criterion 
for effective discourse.
In subject-specific academic discourse, as visible in corpus data, conventions 
in the different academic genres have been established and must be adhered to 
more and more. Even if students are taught about cohesive devices (such as 
conjunctions) on the local level, global coherence is desirable to make supervisors 
or examiners feel ‘at ease’ and satisfied without distracting them with marked 
phrases that only ‘stick out’ because conventions are not met.
In humanoid-human discourse, anticipating human responses is crucial for 
establishing credibility as a basis for satisfactory cooperation between humanoid 
agents and humans. The focus on intentionality – attributing of intentions to the 
agent and construing credibility explicitly in language – depends, of course, on 
the conscious collaboration from the three research components of this project 
(cf. Figure 6 above, section 4.4): language input, computational deep-learning 
processing and measuring of learning output – but it is not a predictable, 
prefabricated, pre-programmed list of orders and set phrases, thus it expands the 
limits of discourse again if the non-human contribution increases.
Finally, the functional linguistic concept of cohesion can be useful to signal 
mutual effort to achieve effective, interactive, coherent discourse. It includes the 
concept of Intentionality not only as an abstract concept, but as a very concrete 
language feature, since cohesive features also serve as Intentionality markers 
across utterances. Just as coherence is easier to construe for the reader when the 
writer uses cohesive devices, Intentionality can be better assumed by the reader 
when the intention to cooperate in discourse is signalled in explicit Intentionality 
cohesion by the writer.
To conclude, although the mechanisms that are the basis of such limits of 
discourse are well-known from the related literature (e.g. Hasan’s 1984 concept 
of ‘cohesive harmony’), the limits of discourse have only come to the public 
discourse level through the recent digitalisation of discourses. However, our 
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linguistic concept of discourse as Intentionality-based, coherent effective 
interaction has been supported recently by electrophysiological research. 
Stolk et al. (2014: 18184) conclude from their experiments with twenty-seven 
pairs of participants, who were given the task to communicate on a digital 
board game, that “effective communication arises only when a pair converges 
on a shared meaning”. Thus, discourse is interaction, an act that is directed at 
initiating another cooperative act by the discourse partner. In a participatory 
ideal, discourse interaction brings satisfaction. Hopefully, only a minority draws 
satisfaction from showing the limits of discourse. Both types of Intentionality are 
possible, since a political response may be directed at maintaining or disrupting 
coherence in society. I hope to have shown that even here traditional concepts (like 
inferencing and presuppositions) can be supplemented by functional-pragmatic 
concepts (like cohesion and Intentionality) to reveal and analyse the dangers 
of discord in discourse as an indicator of discord in society and the limits of 
discourse in our times.
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Harris and Chomsky: https://samharris.org/the-limits-of-discourse/ (last accessed 10/09/19) from 
May 1, 2015: Sam Harris and Noam Chomsky attempt to have a conversation about the ethics 
of war, terrorism, state surveillance, and related topics – and fail. Though this is an interesting 
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discussed here, because the opponents basically agree to disagree and no further discourse is 
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text-specific ‘emotions’ to the interaction by tone, face or hand/arm variation. This again pushes 
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with the latter more directed or specific than the former (in addition to the stylistic difference that 
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